Multiplication and comultiplication of beliefs represent a generalisation of multiplication and comultiplication of probabilities as well as of binary logic AND and OR. Our approach follows that of subjective logic, where belief functions are expressed as opinions that are interpreted as being equivalent to beta probability distributions. We compare different types of opinion product and coproduct, and show that they represent very good approximations of the the analytical product and coproduct of beta probability distributions. We also define division and codivision of opinions, and compare our framework with other logic frameworks for combining uncertain propositions.
Introduction
Subjective logic (Jøsang 2001 [2] ) is a belief calculus based on the Dempster-Shafer belief theory (Shafer 1976 [5] ). In subjective logic the term opinion denotes beliefs about propositions, and a set of standard and non-standard logic operators can be used to combine opinions about propositions in various ways. A particular type of multiplication and comultiplication called propositional conjunction and propositional disjunction in Jøsang 2001 [2] will be called simple multiplication and simple comultiplication here. In Jøsang 2001 [2] it was also described how every opinion can be uniquely mapped to a beta probability distribution, thereby providing a specific interpretation of belief functions in Bayesian probabilistic terms. A vacuous opinion about a binary proposition is for example equivalent to a uniform probability distribution. A question left open in Jøsang 2001 [2] was why simple multiplication of two vacuous opinions produces a product opinion that when mapped to a beta distribution is slightly different from the analytical product of two uniform distributions. Below we will explain the reason for this difference, and also define alternatives to simple multiplication and simple comultiplication in the form of normal multiplication and normal comultiplication of opinions. Simple and normal multiplication and comultiplication are compared to analytical multiplication and comultiplication of beta distributions in the general case. We also define the inverse opinion operators normal division and normal codivision.
Fundamentals of Subjective Logic
Subjective logic is suitable for approximate reasoning in situations where there is more or less uncertainty about whether a given proposition is true or false, and this uncertainty can be expressed by a belief mass assignment (BMA) where a quantity of belief mass on a given proposition can be interpreted as contributing to the probability that the proposition is true. More specifically, if a set denoted by ¡ of exhaustive mutually exclusive singletons can be defined, this set is referred to as a frame of discernment. Each singleton, which will be called an atomic element hereafter, can be interpreted as a proposition that can be either true or false. The powerset of ¡ denoted by ¢ ¤ £ contains all possible subsets of ¡ . The set ¢ ¥ £ § ¦ © of nonempty subsets of ¡ will be called its reduced powerset. A BMA assigns belief mass to nonempty subsets of ¡ (i.e. to elements of ¢ £ ¦ ) without specifying any detail of how to distribute the belief mass amongst the elements of a particular subset. In this case, then for any non-atomic subset of ¡ , a belief mass on that subset expresses uncertainty regarding the probability distribution over the elements of the subset. More generally, a belief mass assignment on ¡ is defined as a function from the BMA is dogmatic [7] . Let us note, that trivially, every Bayesian belief function is dogmatic. When all the focal elements are nestable (i.e. linearly ordered by inclusion), then the BMA is consonant.
Called basic probability assignment in Shafer 1976 [5] .
Given a particular frame of discernment and a BMA, the Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer 1976 [5] ) defines a belief function ¡ 0 B 2 5 4 . In addition, subjective logic (Jøsang 2001 [2] ) defines a disbelief function ¢ 0 B 2 5 4 , an uncertainty function 
The relative atomicity function of a subset 2 relative to the frame of discernment ¡ is simply denoted by ¤ 0 B 2 5 4 . It can be shown that the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions defined above satisfy: 
The belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions are dependent through Eq.(7) so that one is redundant. As such they represent nothing more than the traditional Bel0 . However, the interpretation of the term "doubt" is problematic in case of e.g. "total doubt", i.e. where Dou0 B 2 5 4 6 # , whereas the term "total disbelief", i.e. with ¢ 0 B 2 5 4 7 6 8 # leaves little room for misinterpretation. We therefore prefer to use the term "disbelief" rather than "doubt".
Definition (6) is equivalent to the pignistic probability function described by Smets & Kennes [8] , and corresponds to the principle of insufficient reason: a belief mass assigned to the union of C atomic sets is split equally among these C sets. Section 9 below describes how belief functions can be mapped to beta probability distributions, thereby making pignistic probability equivalent to expected probability. In order to reflect this equivalence and to avoid any confusion, we prefer to use the term "probability expectation", denoted by © 0 B 2 5 4 , both for belief functions and for probability distributions, rather than to use "pignistic probability" for the former and "probability expectation" for the latter.
Subjective logic operators apply to binary frames of discernment, so in case a frame is larger than binary, a coarsening is required in order to reduce its size to binary. Coarsening in subjective logic focuses on a particular subset 2 ¡ ¡ , and produces a binary frame of discernment 
This coarsening is called "simple" because the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions are identical to the original functions on ¡ . The relative atomicity ¤ ( on the other hand produces a synthetic relative atomicity value which does not represent the real relative atomicity of 2 on ¡ in general, but one that satisfies:
which is a special case of Eq.(6).
Next, the normal coarsening method is described. According to normal coarsening which is presented in Jøsang and Grandison 2003 [3] , the belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative atomicity functions are defined as: 
This coarsening is called "normal" because the relative atomicity reflects the true relative cardinality of an element in the original frame of discernment. It is important to note the distinction between the relative cardinality of an element 2 in its original frame of discernment, and in the coarsened binary frame of discernment. The former is expressed by the relative atomicity, and the latter is always 9
¤ £
With normal coarsening, the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions on the focused frame of discernment . The interpretation of the tendency of normal coarsening to decrease the uncertainty and increase the belief and disbelief functions, is that belief masses that contribute to the uncertainty function can represent varying amounts of uncertainty relative to a given proposition. When considering for example the frame of discernment In the terminology of subjective logic, an opinion ( held by an individual about a proposition 2 is the ordered quadruple 0
( determine the position of the point in the triangle representing the opinion. Fig.1 illustrates an example where the opinion about a proposition 2 from a binary frame of discernment has the value ( 6 0 9 The top vertex of the triangle represents uncertainty, the bottom left vertex represents disbelief, and the bottom right vertex represents belief. The parameter ¡ ( is the value of a linear function on the triangle which takes value 0 on the edge which joins the uncertainty and disbelief vertices and takes value 1 at the belief vertex. In other words, ¡ ( is equal to the quotient when the perpendicular distance between the opinion point and the edge joining the uncertainty and disbelief vertices is divided by the perpendicular distance between the belief vertex and the same edge. The parameters ¢ ( and £ ( are determined similarly. The edge joining the disbelief and belief vertices is called the probability axis. The relative atomicity is indicated by a point on the probability axis, and the projector starting from the opinion point is parallel to the line that joins the uncertainty vertex and the relative atomicity point on the probability axis. The point at which the projector meets the probability axis determines the probability expectation value of the opinion, i.e. it coincides with the point corresponding to expectation value
Products of Binary Frames of Discernment
Multiplication and comultiplication in subjective logic are binary operators that take opinions about two elements from distinct binary frames of discernment as input parameters. The product and coproduct opinions relate to subsets of the Cartesian product of the two binary frames of discernment. The Cartesian product of the two binary frames of discernment 
Similarly, the normal relative atomicity of 2 By applying simple or normal coarsening to the product frame of discernment and BMA, the simple and normal product and coproduct opinions emerge. A coarsening that focuses on 2 ¥ § produces the product, and a coarsening that focuses on in case of comultiplication. Non-Bayesian coarsenings will cause the product and coproduct of opinions to deviate from the analytically correct product and coproduct. However, the magnitude of this deviation is always small, as will be explained in Section 10.
The symbols "¢ " and "£ " will be used to denote multiplication and comultiplication of opinions respectively so that we can write:
The product of the opinions about 2 and § is thus the opinion about the conjunction of 2 and §
. Similarly, the coproduct of the opinions about 2 and §
is the opinion about the disjunction of 2 and §
. The exact expressions for product and coproduct are given in Sections 4 and 5.
Readers might have noticed that Eq.(22) can appear to be a direct application of the non-normalised version of Dempster's rule (i.e. the conjunctive rule of combination) [5] which is a method of belief fusion. However the difference is that Dempster's rule applies to the beliefs of two different and independent observers faced with the same frame of discernment, whereas the Cartesian product of Eq.(22) applies to the beliefs of the same observer faced with two different and independent frames of discernment. Let The Cartesian product as described here thus has no relationship to Dempster's rule and belief fusion other than the apparent similarity between Eq.(22) and Dempster's rule.
Simple Multiplication and Comultiplication
The product and coproduct of opinions held by a single individual with respect to independent propositions 2 and § 
This makes sense since an outcome can lead to no definitive conclusion about the truth of 2 § if and only if it does not lead to the definite conclusion that either is true and it does not lead to the definite conclusion that both are false, leaving only the three alternatives: 
Under normal coarsening of the BMA for the Cartesian product of the binary frames of discernment, the normal opinion for the disjunction, 2 However it should be noted that multiplication and comultiplication are not distributive over each other, i.e. for example that:
This is to be expected because if 2 , § and are independent, then 2 ¥ § and 2 ¥ are not generally independent in probability calculus. In fact the corresponding result only holds for binary logic.
Normal Division and Codivision
The inverse operation to multiplication is division. The quotient of opinions about propositions 2 and §
represents the opinion about a proposition which is independent of § such that 
Probability Distributions over Subsets of ¡
In the previous sections, two variants of the multiplication and comultiplication operators were described. In order to interpret these operators and assess their correctness, we will define a mapping between opinions and beta probability distributions. The purpose of this is to be able to compare products of opinions with products of beta distributions, and similarly for coproducts. Ideally, they should be equivalent, but unfortunately that is not always possible.
For this analysis, we are interested in knowing the probability distribution over subsets of the frame of discernment. In the binary case it is determined by the beta distribution. In the case of exhaustive and mutually exclusive subsets, it is determined by the Dirichlet distribution which we explain in some detail in this section.
The Dirichlet distribution describes the joint distribution of random variables . Note that although the definition of Dirichlet random variable is symmetric, the probability density is not symmetrically defined ( ¥ is not an argument of the probability distribution function). The same functional form for the probability distribution function arises for any choice of ¦ # of the component random variables (since the Jacobian of the transformations between such subsets always has absolute value # ).
We now ask what happens if instead of 0 § ¡ £ 3 4
© ¥ £
, we take sums of the random variables, so we are interested in the distribution of
for nontrivial partitions of# ¤ " & 9 $ 9 $ 9 " (i.e. any partition not consisting of the elements# ¤ " $ 9 $ 9 $ 9 " and ). The distribution is given by:
i.e. the distribution is still a Dirichlet distribution, and the parameter corresponding to a specific sum of random variables is given by the sum of the parameters corresponding to the constituent addends.
The proof of this theorem can be found in standard textbooks, and is also given in the appendix. It follows that for any nontrivial subset In plain language this means that when a Dirichlet distribution can be defined over an exhaustive and mutually exclusive partitioning of the frame of discernment, it is possible to define a beta probability distribution over any binary coarsening of this partitioning. This corresponds to the Bayesian coarsening that was defined in Section 2.
A Priori Distribution for Alternatives
Now, we come to the question of an a priori distribution function for the probabilities of exhaustive and mutually exclusive alternatives (e.g. different colours of balls in an urn). Let Generalising the case of ¢ alternatives (with their beta distribution), we will take an a priori Dirichlet distribution. Since there is no reason to assume a preference for any alternative over any other alternative, then the parameters will be taken to be equal (with the result that ). In the case of ¢ alternatives, a uniform distribution has been assumed (i.e. beta0 # " $ # 4 ). The question arises as to whether this fact can be used to determine the common value of the parameters in the case of alternatives on the grounds of consistency. It can be argued that such a determination is possible, and that the common value of the parameters is 
This means that, in the case of variously coloured balls in an urn, if the expected a priori probability of picking a ball of a given colour in the absence of bias is ¤ , then the a priori distribution for the probability is:
and it seems reasonable to extend this assumption to the more general case (i.e. in any binary event, if the expected a priori probability in the absence of bias is ¤ , then an a priori distribution according to Eq.(30) will be assumed). Bayesian updating now allows new evidence to be added. Let 
For example, if an observer is presented with an urn containing red and black balls, without knowing the proportion of each colour, then there is no reason to expect that the probability of picking a red ball should be greater or less than the probability of picking a black ball, so the a priori probability of picking a red ball is ¤ 6 9 ¤ £
, and the a priori beta distribution is beta (1,1) . Assume that the observer picks 8 balls of which 7 turn out to be red and only one turns out to be black. The updated beta distribution of the outcome of picking red balls is beta0
which is illustrated in Fig.8 . So far so good. However everything is not as simple as it seems, because there are cases where the a priori distribution for the probability in the absence of bias can not be determined according to the above analysis.
Take for example the following case where an event whose expected probability in the absence of bias is ¤ § 6 ¢ , but whose a priori distribution for the probability is We will contrast this with the case of four exhaustive and mutually exclusive propo-
, with no reason for preferring any of these propositions over any of the others. The a priori distribution of the corresponding probabilities is Dirichlet 
Mapping Between Opinions and Beta Distributions
The correspondence between opinions expressed as quadruples 0 is not immediately obvious. However, it is possible to fix certain requirements for the beta distribution which corresponds with a given opinion. Note that the space of opinions has three degrees of freedom (there are four variables, , and the space of beta distributions has two degrees of freedom (because it has two parameters), so most of the beta distributions which correspond to an opinion can be expected to correspond to a continuum of opinions, with one degree of freedom. Since an opinion has an expectation value for the probability, i.e. , then the first requirement will be that the expectation value for the probability for the opinion be equal to the probability expectation value for the beta distribution, i.e.: 
Secondly, if the uncertainty decreases while the probability expectation value for the opinion and the atomicity remain constant, then that reflects a greater confidence in the individual that the probability that the system is in the state 2 is given by is equal to zero, that represents the dogmatic opinion that the probability that the system is in the state 2 is ¡ ( and the probability that the system is in the state 2 is
in this case, then the laws of probability are still satisfied). Since the opinion is dogmatic, the variance of the corresponding beta distribution must be zero. This is actually impossible, so the only means of satisfying this particular requirement is to take the limit as 
thus demonstrating explicitly that the variance decreases as increases.
One suggestion that would satisfy the requirements for is 
One can use the arguments from Section 8 to justify that it is reasonable to take £ was taken to be constant, and set equal to 2, so that in the absence of evidence, when the atomicity is , the a priori distribution is uniform (this requirement forces a choice of £ 6 ¢ ). This particular correspondence can be described as:
As already mentioned, the beta distribution really only has two degrees of freedom, so that there will always be ranges of values in the expression for the opinion in Eq.(38) which actually produce the same beta parameters. This will be the case for the ranges of 0 By comparing the parameters of the beta distribution in Eq.(38) with those in Eq.(31) it can be seen that the relative atomicity in fact defines the a priori parameters of beta distribution expressed by:
By considering the a priori beta parameters as separate from the evidence parameters which distinguishes between a priori and a posteriori information, then a bijective mapping between opinions and augmented beta distributions can be defined as:
It can be noted that under this correspondence the example opinion of Fig.1 can take, is not really a valid objection to the correspondence between opinion and beta distribution currently used.
While Eq.(40) provides a bijective (one-to-one) mapping from opinions to augmented beta distributions, we would also like to know the correspondence between BMAs and beta distributions. The simple and normal coarsenings described in Section 2 define two different surjective (onto) correspondences from BMAs to opinions. It was noted that simple coarsening has the drawback that the relative atomicity in general does not reflect the real relative cardinality, whereas normal coarsening has the drawback that the belief, disbelief and uncertainty parameters must be adjusted. It was also shown that these drawbacks disappear when the two coarsenings produce equal results, which is the case when Eq. (21) Because the correspondence of Eq. (40) is bijective, there exists a surjective mapping from BMAs to beta distributions. The fact that there are two different mappings from BMAs to opinions can be problematic, because in practical situations, one of them must be selected. In general, normal coarsening provides the best interpretation of BMAs in terms of opinions because of the correct relative atomicity. The next section also shows that normal multiplication and comultiplication provides the best approximation of the product and coproduct of beta distributions.
Comparison of Multiplication and Comultiplication Operators
For the purpose of comparing simple and normal multiplication with multiplication of beta distributions, we denote by beta0 Given the interpretation of opinions as beta distributions, and assuming the product and coproduct of beta distributions to be analytically correct, it would have been desirable for multiplication and comultiplication operators of opinions to satisfy:
It is known that if the probabilities of independent propositions 2 and § have beta distributions, then the probabilities of 2 " ¥ 7 § and 2
§
do not have beta distributions, except under extraordinary circumstances, i.e. it can happen, but such a happenstance is an exception rather than the rule. It is thus impossible for the mul-tiplication and comultiplication operators described in Sections 4 and 5 to satisfy Eq.(41) and Eq.(42) in general. The deviation between the left and right sides of Eq.(41) and Eq.(42) is partly due to non-Bayesian coarsening of ¢ ¡ as explained in Section 2, and partly due to the difference in circumstances around the a priori probability distributions over the conjunction and disjunction of two independent variables 2 and §
, and four exhaustive and mutually exclusive variables
, as explained in Section 8. In the following we will try to determine how close the multiplication and comultiplication operators are to satisfying Eq. (41) . This reflects the fact that the uncertainty of the normal opinion product is less than the uncertainty of the simple opinion product.
Similarly, the variance of beta0 , and similarly for the coproducts.
Since the first and second moments of a random variable As a result, the first and second moments of the product and coproduct of beta distributions (i.e. beta0 
Similarly for the simple and normal coproducts beta0
and beta0 ( ¤ §4
, the value of the first moment (i.e. the probability expectation value) is the same as the first moment of beta0 
Both of these results are to be expected since the opinions were designed specifically to yield the correct value for the first moment.
For simple product and coproduct of opinions, the second moment of beta0 Based on the above analysis it seems that normal multiplication and comultiplication of opinions corresponds more closely to the analytically correct multiplication and comultiplication of beta distributions, than do simple multiplication and comultiplication of opinions. Although not perfect, normal multiplication and comultiplication are thus able to produce a good approximation of the analytically correct products and coproducts.
It is important to know how good this approximation is. This can be done by investigating the difference between the variance of beta0 (the case of the coproduct follows immediately from the duality, i.e. from de Morgan's Laws). Equivalently, the difference between the second moments can be studied since it is equal to the difference between the variances (as a consequence of the fact that the first moments are equal). The problem is difficult analytically, so a graphical approach has been adopted. Since the comparison is between the product of the beta distributions corresponding to two opinions, and the beta distribution of the normal product of the same opinions, and since each opinion has three degrees of freedom, then the problem has six degrees of freedom, which is four more than we are capable of visualising graphically (we need the third dimension for the dependent variable, i.e. the difference between the variances). This means for a graphical investigation into the behaviour, four independent conditions must be imposed on the opinions. In the Fig. 12 , for example, we have set . When the common value of the uncertainty is 0 (i.e. for dogmatic opinions), the difference is zero, so that the variance of beta0 . This is precisely the difference which is illustrated in Fig.9 . Because the conjectured difference is so small, then the normal product and normal coproduct can be considered to be very good approximations to the product and coproduct, respectively, of the beta distributions of the individual opinions.
Correspondence to Other Logic Frameworks
The subjective logic operators described above represent generalisations of classical probability and logic operators in the context of belief theory. In the case of dogmatic opinions, i.e. when Multiplication, comultiplication, division and codivision of dogmatic opinions are equivalent to the corresponding probability operators in Table 1 . Table 1 Probability operators resulting from opinion operators.
The correspondence between binary logic operators and probability/opinion opera-tors is given in Table 2 below. Some of the operators are not widely used, and new names and symbols had to be defined. Table 2 Correspondence between probability, set and logic operators.
It can be shown that the multiplication and comultiplication operators produce the classical truth tables of AND and OR for the special cases where 0 B 2 5 4 6 # or 0 B 2 5 4 6 . Similarly the truth tables of UN-AND and UN-OR can be determined through the division and codivision operators. Table 3 , which e.g. can be derived from the expressions in Table 1 F  T  F  T  F  undefined   T  F  F  T  undefined  T   T  T  T  T  T  T or F  Table 3 Truth tables for AND, OR, UN-AND and UN-OR.
It can be shown that simple multiplication and comultiplication represent a generalisation of the ¥ and¨operators in Kleene's (1950) It can also be mentioned that simple multiplication and comultiplication are equivalent to the "AND" and "OR" operators of Baldwin's support logic (Baldwin 1986 [1]) except for the relative atomicity parameter which is absent in Baldwin's logic. In Baldwin's logic, each proposition has a support pair . This intuitive observation can not be derived by Kleene's or Baldwin's frameworks, but is explicitly reflected in subjective logic through the relative atomicity and the probability expectation value.
Conclusion
The two coarsening methods described in Sec.2 describe two different surjective mappings from a generalised frame of discernment and BMA to the opinion space. Eq.(40) defines a bijective mapping between opinions and the sub-class of beta probability distribution functions beta0 § " @ 9 4 where 5 9
¢ .
The coarsening process together with the bijective correspondence between opinions and beta distributions provides a specific interpretation of belief functions in terms of Bayesian probabilities. Two opinions that correspond to beta distributions can be multiplied or comultiplied to produce a new product or coproduct opinion that also corresponds to a beta distribution. Under this interpretation our analysis of multiplication and comultiplication of opinions has led us to the conclusion that these operators only provide an approximation of the analytical multiplication and comultiplication of beta distributions.
In general the product of two beta distributions is not a beta distribution, and the analytical expressions for products and coproducts of probability distributions quickly become exceedingly complex, whereas the expressions for products and coproducts of opinions are very simple. The advantage of doing calculations with opinions rather that with probability distributions, is a dramatic reduction in complexity.
Since it appears that the variance of the beta distribution for the normal product of opinions differs from the variance of the product of the beta distributions for the individual opinions by no more than about 0.014 (and a similar result holds for the coproduct by de Morgan's Laws), then the approximation of the product of the beta distributions by the normal product of the opinions is very good.
